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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
SECTION 324A IN SEAY V.
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY Co.
N October 1979 Jack Seay and another maintenance employee were
working on a boiler at Gaston Episcopal, Hospital (Gaston) when a
safety relief valve on an adjacent boiler suddenly discharged scalding
steam onto Seay. He died shortly thereafter from the resulting injuries.
Seay's widow and children brought suit against Travelers Indemnity Com-
pany (Travelers),' alleging that Travelers had negligently inspected the
boiler and that this negligent inspection had proximately caused Seay's
death.
The Texas Boiler Inspection Act (TBIA) regulates the type of boilers used
at Gaston. 2 Under the TBIA authorized inspectors must periodically in-
spect steam boilers. The inspectors are either state employees or state com-
missioned employees of insurance companies or inspection agencies. 3 If the
inspectors determine that a boiler is safe, the Commissioner of the Texas
Department of Labor Standards issues a certificate permitting lawful opera-
tion of the boiler.4 The commissioner may authorize the repair, shut-down,
or condemnation of a boiler that the inspectors determine is unsafe. 5
TBIA's purpose is to protect lives and property from unsafe boilers. 6
Travelers, the insurer of Gaston's boilers, had for several years sent em-
ployees to perform the statutory inspections at Gaston. Travelers' inspectors
had reported favorably on the boilers' conditions. As a result, the commis-
sioner had issued the required certificates of operation. The inspectors, how-
ever, had failed to report that the relief valves on some of the boilers did not
discharge to the outside of the building. This valve setup allegedly violated
1. The plaintiff also sued Gaston and the engineers, architects, consultants, and general
contractor who designed and constructed the boiler and boiler room. Seay v. Hall, 663 S.W.2d
468 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984).
2. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221c (Vernon 1987).
3. Id. § 10. See Quinn, Bungled Inspections: A Polemic Against Insurer Liability [With
Special Reference to Boilers], 4 TEX. INS. L. REP. 17, 26 (1986), for a description of the proce-
dures followed in boiler inspections, and the interaction between the state, the inspectors, and
the insureds. Steam heating boilers must be inspected biennually: externally, and internally
where construction permits. TBIA §§ 1(24), 4(2).
4. TBIA § 4.
5. Id.
6. Brownstone Park Ltd. v. Southern Union Gas Co., 537 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the safety standards that the TBIA references. 7
The plaintiffs contended that under common law and section 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts8 Travelers owed a duty to Seay to use reason-
able care in the statutory inspection because Travelers had undertaken to
inspect the boilers. The trial court granted Travelers' motion for summary
judgment. The Dallas court of appeals decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
Held, reversed and remanded: An insurer owes a duty under section 324A
to the employee of its insured when the insurer performs a statutorily re-
quired inspection in the absence of an expert third-party contractor. 9 Seay v.
Travelers Indemnity Co., 730 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
I. HISTORY BEHIND "UNDERTAKING" LIABILITY IN TEXAS
A. Background
Under common law rules an occupier of real property must keep his
premises in a reasonably safe condition for his invitees.10 This duty requires
the occupier to inspect and to discover dangerous conditions." Similarly, an
employer has a nondelegable duty to furnish his employees with a reason-
ably safe place to work and reasonably safe machinery. 12
A mere bystander, however, has no duty to protect others from danger. 13
This rule applies even if the bystander is aware of the potential danger.14 In
Buchanan v. Rose ' 5 the Texas Supreme Court held that the defendant had
no duty to warn others after defendant's truck driver drove over a weak
7. The TBIA adopts the standards that the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
promulgates. TBIA § 1(4), (9), (39), (40).
8. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to an-
other which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person
or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person
upon the undertaking.
Id. [hereinafter section 324A].
9. The court presented its resolution of the issue in this manner in order to avoid a
conflict with Brownstone Park Ltd. v. Southern Union Gas Co., 537 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Brownstone the Austin court of civil appeals held
that an inspecting insurer owed no duty to the owner of the boiler or to the third party who
had contracted to maintain the boiler. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
10. Abalos v. Oil Dev. Co., 544 S.W.2d 627, 635 (Tex. 1976).
11. Id. The court stated: "[The occupier's] duty is to protect his invitees from dangers of
which he ... knows, or (because of his duty to inspect) of which he should know in the exercise
of ordinary care." Id. (emphasis in original).
12. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 923-24 (Tex. 1981); Fort Worth Eleva-
tors Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 135-36, 70 S.W.2d 397, 401 (1934). The Texas Supreme
Court overruled Fort Worth Elevators in part in Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 725 S.W.2d 712,
714 (Tex. 1987) (addresses proof of actual damages in worker's compensation context).
13. Abalos, 544 S.W.2d at 633.




bridge and crushed part of it. 16 The question is, at what point does a non-
occupier of premises, such as an inspector, become more than a mere by-
stander, thus owing a duty to others on the premises.
Texas courts have used three sources of law to answer this question. Early
decisions relied on case law to find a duty in the undertaker when an under-
taking must be performed carefully to prevent physical danger.' 7 Control
over the dangerous situation is an important factor in finding a duty in this
line of cases. 18 Since 1976, Texas courts have also used the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, section 323, to determine whether a nonoccupier owes a
duty to others.19 Under section 323 a duty arises when one undertakes to
render a service necessary for protecting people or property and (a) the un-
dertaker increases the risk of harm or (b) the injury occurs because of reli-
ance on the undertaking. 20 The Seay decision adds a third source of law,
section 324A, for courts to use in deciding the duty issue.2' Section 324A is
similar to section 323, but section 324A extends the duty to third persons
injured by a negligently performed service. 22 A duty under section 324A
arises when the undertaking is necessary to protect a third person or his
property and the undertaker increases the risk of harm, or the undertaker
performs a duty the recipient of service owed the third person, or the third
person's reliance on the undertaking creates harm. 23
Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co.24 illustrates a nonoccupier's duty to use care to
protect others from danger. Fox was a night watchman for A. Harris & Co.,
which leased part of a building owned by Adolphus Busch. Busch also
owned most of the stock in the defendant, Dallas Hotel Co. For considera-
tion and to serve its own interests, the defendant hotel had put engineers in
charge and control of the elevators in the Busch building. Fox was using one
of the elevators in the course of his duties when it suddenly stopped between
floors. When Fox tried to discover the problem with the elevator, it lurched
down and crushed his legs. He died of the resulting injuries, and his widow
sued the hotel for damages. The jury found that the hotel had negligently
allowed the elevator to become dangerous.25
The Texas Supreme Court held that it could not excuse the hotel's negli-
gence for lack of contractual privity between Fox and the hotel. 26 The hotel
had agreed by contract to perform what might have been one of A. Harris &
Co.'s nondelegable duties to Harris's employee, Fox. The contract did not
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 32, 34 and accompanying text.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) [hereinafter section 323]. For the
text of section 323, see infra note 34.
21. Seay v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 730 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
22. See supra note 8.
23. Id.
24. 111 Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922). The Texas Supreme Court overruled Fox in part
in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 925 (Tex. 1981) (addresses separate submission
of each issue).
25. Fox, 111 Tex. at 469, 240 S.W. at 518.
26. Id. at 473, 240 S.W. at 521.
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directly create the duty to Fox; instead, the hotel's assumption of control as
per the contract imposed the duty indirectly. 27 Fox provides the rule that an
implicit duty to use reasonable care in an undertaking arises if the undertak-
ing involves the prevention of personal injuries. 28
Under the rule of Fox the duty to keep premises safe spreads from an
occupier to an undertaker when the undertaker exercises control over some-
thing that might cause personal injury.29 In a recent case the Texas
Supreme Court extended this logic considerably when it held an employer
who exercised control over a drunk employee liable for the damages the em-
ployee caused while he was driving home from work. 30 When a defendant
performs an undertaking off-premises, courts will impose a duty even if the
undertaker does not control the situation. In the off-premises scenario, who-
ever set up the condition is responsible for ensuring the safety of that
condition. 3 1
B. The Use of Section 323
The Texas Supreme Court used section 323 for the first time in Colonial
Savings Association v. Taylor.32 The court cited Fox to illustrate that Texas
has long recognized the proposition that a duty to use reasonable care not to
injure the person or property of another arises when one voluntarily under-
takes an affirmative action for the benefit of that other person. 33 The court
27. The court stated: "Having brought under its control a mechanical appliance ...
known to be attended by grave risks, defendant ...was under the specific, legal duty to
exercise ordinary care to protect those for whose use the appliance was provided . Id.,
240 S.W. at 520-21.
28. Id., 240 S.W. at 520. Specifically, the court declared: "The duty is grounded on the
obligation to exercise ordinary care in an undertaking which cannot otherwise be carried on
without endangering the lives and limbs of others." Id.
29. For cases applying Fox, see Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 463, 226 S.W.2d 425, 430
(1950) (contractual terms and evidence of actual control over premises created duty in general
contractor to use reasonable care to furnish safe workplace for all employees on job); Brewer v.
Otis Elevator Co., 422 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (since elevator service contract provided that Otis would make repairs according to
Otis's judgment, and not that of premises' owners, Otis assumed joint control over elevator
insofar as necessary to perform contract; Otis owed no duty regarding light fixtures because
service contract expressly excluded responsibility for light); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Selph, 250
S.W.2d 883, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (existence of duty de-
pended upon whether Howe had required control of premises).
30. Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. 1983) (when employer exercises
control over drunk employee, employer assumes duty of ordinary care to prevent the employee
from causing unreasonable risk of harm to others). The Otis dissent criticized the majority
decision because Otis did not create the dangerous situation; under the Buchanan rule, supra
notes 15-16 and accompanying text, Ot's should be vindicated. Otis, 668 S.W.2d at 313 (Mc-
Gee, J., dissenting).
31. Osuna v. Southern Pac. R.R., 641 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. 1982) (although statute did
not require flashing signal, once railroad undertook to place signal at crossing to warn motor-
ists, railroad assumed duty to keep signal in working order); Bolin v. Tenneco Oil Co., 373
S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when oil company
voluntarily made temporary repairs to public road, it created duty to make road safe to fore-
seeable automobile traffic).
32. 544 S.W.2d 116, 119-20 (Tex. 1976).
33. Id. at 119. The court stated: "[O]ne who voluntarily undertakes an affirmative course
of action for the benefit of another has a duty to exercise reasonable care that the other's
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then quoted section 323 as the expression of the historical rule and applied
section 323 to the case.3 4 Section 323 differs from the historical rule, how-
ever, as section 323 does not require that the undertaking be for the benefit
of another. 35 In addition to an undertaking, section 323 requires a showing
that the failure to use reasonable care in the undertaking increased the risk
of harm, 36 or that the injured party suffered harm because he relied on the
undertaking. 37
In Colonial Savings a fire destroyed Taylor's uninsured house. The mort-
gagee of the property, Colonial Savings Association (Colonial Savings), had
written a letter to Taylor stating that Colonial Savings had obtained insur-
ance for the property. Taylor owned two buildings on the property, but the
insurance policy covered only one of the buildings. The court held that the
letter sufficiently supported the jury's finding that Colonial Savings had un-
dertaken to provide fire insurance coverage for both houses.3 8 The court
held that Taylor could not recover under section 323(a), however, because
Colonial Savings' failure to obtain insurance did not increase the risk of fire
to the house. 39 The court remanded the case for the trial court to determine
whether Taylor relied on Colonial Savings' undertaking to obtain insurance
pursuant to section 323(b).40 The court held that Colonial Savings could not
be held liable for Taylor's loss unless Taylor forbore from obtaining his own
insurance in reliance upon Colonial Savings' undertaking to obtain it for
him.4 1
According to the court, Colonial Savings undertook to provide insurance
coverage for Taylor when it informed him by letter that it had done so. 42
Other Texas cases are not as clear, however, in defining an undertaking.43
person or property will not be injured thereby." Id. How the requirement arose that the
undertaker render services "for the benefit of another" is uncertain. In Fox a duty arose when
the defendant undertook to render a service "to promote its own interests." Fox v. Dallas
Hotel Co., III Tex. 461, 473, 240 S.W. 517, 520 (1922).
34. Colonial, 544 S.W.2d at 119-20. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323
(1965) provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to an-
other which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
35. See supra notes 28, 34.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323(a) (1965).
37. Id. § 323(b). The principle underlying the decision in Fox limited liability instead to
situations in which the undertaker or any agent for whom he is responsible sets in motion any
force that causes the injury. Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex. 461, 473-74, 240 S.W.2d 517,
521 (1922).
38. Colonial Sav. Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. 1976).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 121; see supra note 34.
41. Colonial, 544 S.W.2d at 120.
42. Id.
43. Instead of specifically examining what constitutes an undertaking, Texas courts have
skirted the issue. See, e.g., Diaz v. Southwest Wheel, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 770, 772-73 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ) (judgment for defendant because defendant had not in-
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"Undertake" has two distinct possible meanings. 44 An undertaking may be
a promise that expressly or implicitly sets forth the terms of the undertak-
ing. 45 In such situations, the undertaker and the one to whom the under-
taker renders service may limit the duties flowing from the undertaking.46
The other sense of the term is to "enter upon," "set about," or "attempt. '47
In this looser sense, an individual undertakes to do something when he be-
gins doing it, and the scope of the undertaking includes whatever the under-
taker actually does regardless of what he claims he is attempting to do. The
distinction is important because when the undertaker has agreed to do some-
thing for his own benefit, the act may also provide some incidental service to
another to whom the undertaker does not intend to be liable.48
C. Inspection as an Undertaking
In the context of negligent inspection, interpretation of sections 323 and
324A is subject to widely divergent views.49 One commentator has noted
that courts generally do not hold private insurance inspectors as having un-
dertaken to render a service for the benefit of the insured by the mere per-
formance of risk-analysis inspection. 50 Most insurance companies that
inspect try to limit the scope of their undertaking by disclaiming that they
are looking for safety hazards. 51 Generally, liability disclaimers constitute
ineffective shields against intentional and reckless conduct because such dis-
claimers try to waive a preexisting duty. 52 Under sections 323 or 324A,
however, a disclaimer merely prevents a duty from arising if an agreement
creased risk of harm and plaintiff had not relied on defendant's actions); Southern Pac. Transp.
Co. v. Luna, 707 S.W.2d 113, 118, 121-22 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985) (implying that
railroad undertook service by agreeing with state to install crossing guards, but finding no duty
under section 323 because no evidence supported theories of reliance or of increased risk),
rev'd on other grounds, 724 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1987); Brownsville Medical Center v. Garcia,
704 S.W.2d 68, 76 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christ 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (implying that defendant
hospital had undertaken to render services to plaintiff's decedent when it started medical treat-
ment); Peterson v. Mut. Sav. Inst., 646 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ)
(judgment for mortgagee because homeowner failed to show that mortgagee had pursued un-
dertaking for homeowner's benefit); Central Freight Lines v. Pride, 588 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979) (defendant testified that it had undertaken to clean mud off of
highway and that truckers had no responsibility for cleaning, but court decided case under
historical rule stated in Colonial, 544 S.W.2d at 119, rather than under section 323), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. B&B Auto Supply, Sand Pit & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines,
Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1980).
44. See Quinn, supra note 3, at 17, 23, 24.
45. Id. at 24.
46. Id. at 23.
47. Id. at 24.
48. Id.
49. See Comment, An Insurer's Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Inspection, 66 Ky.
L.J. 910, 913-18 (1978) (judicial application of § 324A to negligent inspection ranges from
literal acceptance to constructive rejection); Quinn, supra note 3, at 19, 22, 23 (courts differ
regarding inspection disclaimers effect on insurer liability for negligent inspection).
50. See Comment, Municipal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits. A
National Survey, 58 WASH. L. REV. 537, 556 (1983) (citing Smith v. Allendale Mut. Ins., 410
Mich. 685, 303 N.W.2d 702, 711 (1981) and authorities cited therein).
51. Quinn, supra note 3, at 19.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 comment a (1973).
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defines the undertaking. 53 Thus, some courts have honored inspection
disclaimers. 54
A Texas court dealt with the issue of negligent inspection in Brownstone
Park Ltd. v. Southern Union Gas Co.55 The defendant gas company agreed
in a contract with the plaintiff apartment complex owner that the gas com-
pany would bear sole responsibility for servicing and maintaining the com-
plex's heating plant. Brownstone's owner sued the gas company for
damages caused by a boiler explosion, alleging that the gas company was
negligent. The gas company joined Brownstone's insurance carrier, Hart-
ford, for the insurer's negligent inspection of the boiler. The appellate court
refused to overturn the jury's finding that Hartford was not negligent be-
cause the court could find no ground for a duty on Hartford to either
Brownstone or the gas company. 56
The Texas Supreme Court recently decided that the city of Denton was
not liable for negligent inspection by its employee in City of Denton v. Van
Page.57 An explosion injured Van Page when he entered a storage building
to investigate strange noises. An arsonist had attempted to burn the storage
building on three prior occasions. Each time the Denton fire department
had extinguished the fire. The fire marshall had investigated the scene and
reported his conclusion that someone had used kerosene to set the fire. Van
Page's theory argued that the city, through the fire marshall, negligently
investigated the arson because the city failed to discover and remove the
gasoline in the building, or because it failed to warn Van Page of the danger-
ous condition of the building. 58 The court held the city of Denton not liable
for the building's unsafe condition "because it neither owned, occupied, nor
controlled the premises, nor did it create the dangerous condition." 59 The
majority remained silent on the possible duty that could arise as to a private
person who undertakes to inspect under section 324A.
Van Page represents the first case in which a supreme court justice has
addressed section 324A. Justice Kilgarlin wrote a concurring opinion in
which he cited Colonial Savings, and went on to apply section 324A to the
53. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
54. See Taylor v. Jim Walter Corp., 731 F.2d 266, 267 (5th Cir. 1984); Trosclair v. Bech-
tel Corp., 653 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1981); Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 428
F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1970); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. v. Cooper, 341 So. 2d
665, 667 (Miss. 1977).
55. 537 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. Id. Clearly, the gas company owed a duty of ordinary care under the Fox rule because
it assumed responsibility for maintaining the boiler. See supra note 27. The appellate court
decided Brownstone before the Texas Supreme Court adopted § 323, which added the element
of reliance that was absent from the Fox rule. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Arguably, if the court had decided the case after the adoption of § 323, the court might have
found that Hartford owed a duty to Brownstone, rather than concluding that "any duty he
owed was to the state, not to Southern Union Gas." Brownstone, 537 S.W.2d at 274.
57. 701 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1986).
58. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE Ann. §§ 101.001-
.109 (Vernon 1986) state and local governmental units in Texas waive immunity from tort
liability in cases in which a private entity would be liable.
59. City of Denton, 701 S.W.2d at 835.
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facts of Van Page.60 In Kilgarlin's view the fire marshall undertook to per-
form an inspection of the storage building merely by inspecting it.61 He
concurred with the result because the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of
any of the other three elements required to charge the city with a duty of
ordinary care under section 324A. 62
Section 324A maintains an uncertain foothold in Texas law. The Supreme
Court ignored it in deciding a negligent inspection case, despite express ap-
plication in the concurring opinion. Two appellate courts have mentioned
section 324A as a possible avenue of relief without expressly stating whether
section 324A is the law in Texas or finding a duty thereunder. 63 The Fifth
Circuit, applying Texas law, however, has held that Texas would recognize a
duty under section 324A in a negligent inspection case. 64
Section 324A appears similar to section 323, but it extends the duty to use
reasonable care in an undertaking to protect third parties other than those
for whom the undertaker renders the services. 65 The absence of privity be-
tween parties, such as between an undertaker and a third party under section
324A, will not defeat the existence of a duty in tort under Texas law. 66
60. Id. (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). Justice Ray joined Justice Kilgarlin's opinion.
61. Id. (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). Justice Kilgarlin added: "[T]he city did not agree with
Melton [Van Page's landlord] to inspect the storage shed .... " Id. Justice Kilgarlin thus used
the term undertaking in the looser sense. See supra notes 47-48.
62. City of Denton, 701 S.W.2d at 836-37 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). According to Justice
Kilgarlin, the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant increased the risk or undertook a duty
that Melton owed Van Page, or that the plaintiff relied on the marshall's inspection. Id.
63. Bernard Johnson., Inc. v. Continental Constructors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365, 375 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Roberson v. McCarthy, 620 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Johnson court noted that one may incur a
duty of care by embarking upon an undertaking and cited §§ 323 and 324A, but concluded
that "it would be pure conjecture" to decide that the "appellee intended to plead such a cause
of action." Bernard Johnson, 630 S.W.2d at 378. The plaintiff in Roberson contended that a
fact issue existed that would give rise to a legal duty under § 324A on the part of the defend-
ants toward her deceased husband. The court held that no liability could arise under the
plaintiff's theory because the defendants did not fall within any of the categories defined in
§ 324A and that defendants were mere bystanders who owed no duty according to the rule of
Buchanan v. Rose, 138 Tex. 390, 159 S.W.2d 109 (1942). Roberson, 620 S.W.2d at 914.
64. Johnson v. Abbe Eng'g Co., 749 F.2d 1131, 1132 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984). The court
stated:
While the Texas Supreme Court has never expressly adopted the language used
in § 324A, it has addressed and followed the policy of the Good Samaritan Doc-
trine. [The court cited Colonial.] Following the predictive course required of us
in diversity cases, we hold that the Texas courts would impose on parent corpo-
rations those duties expressed in § 324A.
Id.
65. "The rule stated in this section parallels the one stated in § 323, as to the liability of
the actor to the one to whom he has undertaken to render services. This Section deals with the
liability to third persons." Section 324A comment a. Section 323 and § 324A differ in two
respects. First, the duty in § 323 is to use care to perform this undertaking; in § 324A the duty
is to use care to protect the undertaking. Second, § 324A(b) adds an avenue for relief not
found in § 323; specifically, § 324A creates a duty when one undertakes to perform a duty
owed by the other to a third person. See supra notes 8, 34.
66. Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969) (manufacturer owed duty
to innocent bystander); Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 796 (Tex. 1962) (subcontractor
owed duty to passing motorist); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d
408, 411 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (accountant's duty to third parties); Shat-
terproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ
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NOTES
When the Texas Supreme Court decided Colonial Savings, it cited Fox to
support the proposition that Texas has long recognized the concept of duty
delineated in section 323.67 Fox involved a third person to whom the under-
taker owed a duty. 68 Thus, the Texas Supreme Court will likely adopt sec-
tion 324A when it directly confronts the issue.
II. SEA Y V. TRA VELERS INDEMNITY CO.
Seay is an important case for several reasons. 69 It represents the first
Texas case to expressly adopt section 324A as Texas law. The court ana-
lyzed what constitutes an undertaking, concluding that when a law designed
to promote safety requires inspections, the one who performs the inspection
undertakes to render services to the owner of the item that the inspector
investigates. 70 Furthermore, the logic that the court used implicitly rejects
the validity of inspection liability limitations.7' This case will cause alarm
across the nation in insurance company boardrooms. 72
A. Adoption of Section 324A
In Seay the court held that the rule stated in section 324A is the law in
Texas.7 3 While the court recognized that Texas had not explicitly adopted
section 324A, it pointed out that the Texas Supreme Court in Fox had
adopted the principle underlying section 324A.74 The court stated that sec-
tion 323 mirrors section 324A except that section 324A deals with liability
ref'd n.r.e.) (duty to third party despite absence of privity) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552 (1967)); Continental Fruit Express v. Leas, 110 S.W. 129, 133 (Tex. Civ.
App.-1908, writ ref'd) (car company owed duty to railroad employee).
67. Colonial Sav. Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. 1976).
68. In Fox the court found that the defendant had agreed by contract to perform what
might have been one of Fox's employer's nondelegable duties to Fox. Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co.,
111 Tex. 461, 468-69, 240 S.W. 517, 518 (1922). The case fits neatly into § 324A(b), the only
avenue of duty in § 324A not found in § 323. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
69. In November 1987 the Texas Supreme Court held that service providers impliedly
warrant that repairs or modifications of existing tangible goods or property will be performed
in a good and workmanlike manner, that this implied warranty on such services may not be
waived or disclaimed, and that a breach of this implied warranty on such services is actionable
under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349,
354-56 (1987). The Melody Home case will impact service providers' liability tremendously,
but the opinion probably is limited to nonprofessional services in contractual settings. Seay v.
Travelers Indemnity Co., 730 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ), appears to be
more important in the context of gratuitous undertakings, such as inspections.
70. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 778-79. "Travelers ... was undertaking to render services to
Gaston." Id. at 779.
71. See id. at 778-79.
72. Quinn points out that many states have boiler inspection laws that provide for inspec-
tion by boiler insurers. Quinn, supra note 3, at 21. If these other states follow the precedent of
Seay, boiler insurers may face liability despite the use of inspection disclaimers. Quinn puts
forth a strong argument that public policy and practical considerations weigh against liability
for negligent inspection in the boiler context. Id. at 17. If boiler accident cases proceed be-
yond the summary judgment stage through the plaintiff's use of § 324A, settlement is more
likely.
73. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 777.
74. Id. at 776; see supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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to a third party.75 The courts declared that since absence of privity does not
defeat a duty in tort under Texas law, the Texas Supreme Court's adoption
of section 323 necessarily implies the validity of section 324A. 76
Justice Devany concurred in the court's judgment, but was unwilling to
adopt all of section 324A. 77 In his view Travelers may have assumed a duty
to use reasonable care when it caused the Commissioner of the Texas De-
partment of Labor Standards to issue the certificate pursuant to the TBIA.78
Under Justice Devany's approach the TBIA provides the statutory standard
for negligence per se.79 Justice Devany agreed that the court should reverse
the summary judgment because issues of fact remained regarding the breach
of duty and proximate cause. 80
B. Application of Section 324A
Before the court could reach the application of section 324A to the facts in
Seay, it had to contend with two prior cases holding that an inspecting in-
surer owed no duty to an injured third party.8' The court held that the
decision in Brownstone Park Ltd. v. Southern Union Gas Co.82 did not con-
trol in Seay because the discussion regarding the relationship between the
insured and insurer in Brownstone was merely dictum. 83 Moreover, the facts
necessary for a section 324A analysis were missing in Brownstone.84 With-
out explanation the court declined to follow Philadelphia Manufacturers
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gulf Forge Co. 85 Gulf Forge has little precedential
value because it incorrectly states that Texas law requires that an undertak-
ing be for the sole benefit of the one for whom an undertaker renders a
75. 730 S.W.2d at 776; see supra note 65.
76. 730 S.W.2d at 776-77; see supra note 68.
77. 730 S.W.2d at 782 (Devany, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 781 (Devany, J., concurring). Travelers' authorized inspector reported the find-
ings of the inspection to the commissioner, who then issued the certificate for lawful operation
of the boiler.
79. Id. at 781-82 (Devany, J., concurring). Justice Devany's concurrence is unclear at this
point. Perhaps Justice Devany found that the duty arose under the rules cited in Bennett v.
Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 473-74 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
from which Justice Devany quoted. This approach appears unlikely, however, because the
rules cited in Bennett involve creation of and knowledge of a danger. See id. at 473. Travelers
neither created nor knew of the improper valve setup.
80. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 782 (Devany, J., concurring). According to Justice Devany, the
issue was whether Travelers had failed to follow proper inspection standards. Id.
81. Philadelphia Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Forge Co., 555 F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D. Tex.
1982); Brownstone Park, Ltd. v. Southern Union Gas Co., 537 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. For a discussion of Brownstone, see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
83. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 777. The Seay court stated that in Brownstone Southern Union
raised the point of error against Hartford; thus, any comments on the relationship between
Hartford and Brownstone are dicta, according to State ex rel. Childress v. School Trustees,
150 Tex. 238, 247, 239 S.W.2d 777, 782 (1951). Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 777.
84. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 777. The Seay court found nothing in the Brownstone opinion
that indicated that Hartford's actions had increased the risk of harm, that Hartford had under-
taken to perform a duty that Southern Union owed Brownstone, or that Southern Union had
relied on the safety inspection performed by Hartford. Id.
85. 555 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Tex. 1982); see Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 777.
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service before a duty can arise under section 323.86 The importance of Seay
lies in the rationale that the court used to support its holding. According to
the court, when a law designed to promote safety requires inspections, the
one who performs the inspection undertakes to render services to the owner
of the item that the inspector investigates. 87
After disposing of these precedents, the court applied section 324A to the
facts in Seay. Section 324A contains four elements. 88 The plaintiff must first
prove the undertaking element by showing that the defendant undertook to
render services necessary for the protection of another.89 The plaintiff must
also prove one of the remaining three elements: an increase in the risk,90 the
assumption of another's duty to third persons,9 1 or reliance. 92
The first element necessary to establish liability under section 324A re-
quired a showing that Travelers undertook to render services to Gaston. 93
Travelers contended that the objectives of the inspections were to evaluate
the boilers as an insurable risk, a service to Travelers itself, and to determine
whether the boilers complied with the standards of the TBIA, a service to
the state. The court pointed to the printed inspection forms, 94 Travelers'
manual for its authorized inspectors,95 and the inspector's deposition, in
which the inspector stated that Travelers had made safety-related recom-
mendations to the hospital management. 96 In the court's view, these facts
86. Gulf Forge, 555 F. Supp. at 526 (citing Colonial Sav. Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116
(Tex. 1976)). The Colonial court never implied such a rule; to the contrary, it based its deci-
sion on the precedent in Fox, in which the undertaker rendered a service to promote its own
interest. Colonial, 544 S.W.2d at 119; see Quinn, supra note 3, at 21.
87. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 779. "[W]hen performing inspections pursuant to the [TBIA],
Travelers was performing acts which directly promoted the interests of Gaston in the safety of
its boilers and thereby was undertaking to render services to Gaston." Id. Thus the author-
ized inspector conducts the service not only for the state, but also for the recipient of the
inspection.





93. Less burdensome ways to find that someone owed Seay a duty under § 324A also
exist. For example, an allegation that Travelers was rendering a service to the state as an
authorized inspector would fulfill the undertaking requirement without examining Travelers'
relationship with Gaston. As an authorized inspector, Travelers would realize that the inspec-
tion was necessary for the protection of a third party, specifically anyone coming near the
inspected boilers. Possibly the reason that the court designated Gaston as "another" for whom
the undertaker renders the service was to tie in the "by the other" in § 324A(b) whose duty to
the third person the inspector has undertaken to perform. Assuming Travelers was rendering
a service to the state, however, this approach would leave open the reliance route of § 324A(c).
Under this reasoning, the harm exists because the commissioner relied on the negligent report
and then issued a certificate, leaving a dangerous boiler unchecked. One could also argue that
the state owes a statutory duty to employees who work near boilers to ensure they are in-
spected. "The Commissioner shall cause boilers subject to the provisions of this Act to be
inspected .... " TBIA § 4 (emphasis added).
94. The forms stated that "[i]nspections and recommendations made by The Travelers,
are advisory and designed to assist insureds in the establishment and maintenance of their own
safety activities." Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 778 (emphasis in original).
95. The manual stated that "Code violations must be brought to the attention of the in-
sured when they are discovered .. " Id. (emphasis omitted).
96. Id. at 778-79.
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indicated that one purpose of the inspections was to increase the safety of the
boilers for those who worked near them, regardless of Travelers' motive for
performing the inspections. 97
In addressing the existence of an undertaking the court had to deal with
Travelers' liability disclaimer. Travelers contended that the policy insuring
Gaston's boilers disclaimed any undertaking to determine that the boilers
were safe. The court held the disclaimer could not allow the defendant to
avoid liability because the division of the company that had inspected the
boilers was legally distinct and separate from the division that had issued the
policy.98 The court used the term undertaking in the looser sense, so that
the undertaker stood responsible for everything he did rather than what he
agreed to undertake. 99 Thus, even if the division of Travelers that had in-
spected the boilers had issued the disclaimer, the disclaimer probably would
not have had any legal effect.
Even after Travelers failed to disprove that it undertook to render serv-
ices, the court would have affirmed the summary judgment if an issue of fact
existed as to the three remaining elements in section 324A. Neither side
argued that there was any fact issue as to the second element. Travelers
failed to disprove that it had a duty under the third or fourth element.1°°
A duty under the third element arises when the undertaker has under-
taken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person. 1° 1 Gaston
possessed a common law duty to provide a safe workplace for its employees.
Moreover, a statute designed to promote the safety of boilers required the
inspection of Gaston's boilers. On this basis, the court implied that Gaston
had a duty to its employees to procure a statutory inspection as part of its
duty to provide a safe workplace.102 Travelers failed to disprove that when
it performed the statutory inspection, it undertook Gaston's duty to Seay to
have the boilers inspected. 10 3
Travelers argued that it had no power to enforce compliance with the
TBIA.104 If Travelers had no control over boiler safety, no duty could arise
under the rule of Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co.10 5 A long line of Texas cases re-
97. Id.
98. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 779. To support the statement that a court will not disregard the
legally distinct status of two corporations even though they share common shareholders, the
court cited Mortgage & Trust, Inc. v. Bonner & Co., 572 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Wright Hydraulics, Inc. v. Womack Mach. Supply
Co., 482 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, no writ). Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 779.
99. See Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 780; supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. This view is
in accord with Justice Kilgarlin's concurring opinion in City of Denton v. Van Page, 701
S.W.2d 831, 836 (Tex. 1986) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). See supra note 61.
100. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 780-81. For a description of these elements, see supra notes 90-92
and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
102. The court did not explicitly state this point, but the implication seems logical. "[T]he
evidence fails to disprove that Travelers was performing a duty of care owed by Gaston to its
employees ...." Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 780.
103. Id.
104. Id. Only the commissioner has the power to order repairs or shut down of the boiler.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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quires control over at least part of the premises to create a duty on premises
not possessed by one who renders services. 10 6 The court noted that one
would expect a report from an inspector indicating that the safety valves on
a boiler were dangerous to trigger the enforcement procedures in the
TBIA.' 0 7 Without holding that indirect control appeared sufficient to sup-
port a duty, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove that Travelers
had no power at all to affect boiler safety. 108
Travelers also failed to disprove the fourth element: that Gaston had re-
lied on Travelers' inspection pursuant to section 324A(c). Travelers con-
tended that Gaston could not have relied on the safety inspections because
Gaston possessed its own boiler safety program, 0 9 presumably to show that
Gaston did not satisfy the forbearance standard set out in Colonial Savings
Association v. Taylor.'"0 The administrator of Gaston stated that he relied
on Travelers' inspection of the boilers, and that if the inspector had informed
him of a risk to Gaston employees, he would have complied with any sug-
gested modifications."I' The court held this testimony sufficient to preclude
a no-reliance ruling." 12
III. CONCLUSION
A major shortcoming of the opinion in Seay is the court's failure to dis-
cuss whether its decision comports with public policy. When a novel cause
of action is before the court, the court should consider public policy fac-
tors.11 3 The no-duty decisions in negligent inspection cases commonly sup-
port the result with public policy considerations. 114 The Texas Legislature
has indicated that public policy is against inspector liability, as legislation
expressly immunizes workers' compensation insurance carriers from negli-
gent inspection suits. 1 5 The opinion in Seay would have appeared much
stronger if the court had examined the public policy issue, regardless of
which way that analysis came out.
The holding in Seay v. Travelers Indemnity Co. places a heavy burden on
inspectors, but the court's decision makes sense from a logical viewpoint.
106. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
107. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 780.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Colonial, 544 S.W.2d at 116; see also supra text accompanying note 41 (no liability
under § 323(b) unless Taylor refrained from obtaining insurance in reliance on the bank's
letter).
111. Compare the definition of reliance supra in notes 37-41 and accompanying text with
the standard used in Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 780. One court has determined that the reliance
must be justifiable in order to trigger a duty of ordinary care. Raymer v. United States, 660
F.2d 1136, 1143 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying Kentucky law), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
112. Seay, 730 S.W.2d at 780.
113. In Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983) the court stated that if the
parties present a novel issue, then "factors which should be considered in determining whether
the law should impose a duty are the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed
against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding
against the injury and consequences of placing that burden on the [defendant]." Id. at 309.
114. Comment, supra note 50, at 556.
115. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
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The Texas Legislature enacted the TBIA to help protect lives and property
by improving boiler safety. The commissioner enforces the TBIA through
information he receives from expert inspectors. The TBIA would become
less effective if the inspectors failed to perform the inspections with reason-
able care. The court used liability under section 324A as a method of pro-
moting the legislative directive of improving boiler safety. If inspecting
insurers are held liable to injured employees for the negligence of their in-
spectors, boiler insurance premiums will increase, either to cover the in-
creased risk exposure, or to defray the cost of higher inspection standards.
In the end, boiler owners will bear the cost of boiler safety through higher
insurance premiums. Until the legislature determines that affordability of
insurance outweighs the need to compensate preventable injury, the courts
should further boiler safety through inspector liability., 1 6 The same argu-
ment would apply to any statute that requires inspections as a gratuitous
undertaking.
Kathryn Michele Glegg
116. The legislature is already concerned about the cost of liability insurance. In a bill
passed this summer the legislature found that a serious liability crisis in Texas is adversely
affecting the price and availability of liability insurance and the economic development and
growth of Texas. Tex. S.B. 5, 70th Leg. (1987). The bill did not specifically list boiler owners
among those persons being adversely affected by the insurance crisis, but the Seay decision
could easily create a crisis in boiler insurance. The legislature could avoid such problems by
enacting a statute similar to that which immunizes workers' compensation insurance carriers
from negligent inspection suits. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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